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CONSCIENCE AND CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 
by A. Campbell Garrzett 
r Nowell-Smith telIs a story of an Oxford don who thought it 
uty to attend Common Room, and did so conscientiously, though 
his presence was a source of acute distress both to himself and others. 
This story is told in illustration of a discussion of the question whether 
conscientiousness is good without qualification. The philosopher's com- 
ment is "He would have done better to stay at home," and he reinforces 
this view with the historical judgment that "Robespierre would have been 
a better man (quite apart from the question of the harm he did) if he 
had given his conscience a thorough rest and indulged his taste for roses 
and sentimental verse."l The harm, in these cases, he points out, seems 
to spring, in part at least, from the very conscientiousness of these peo- 
ple, and he concludes that we have no reason for accepting the principle 
of the supreme value of conscientiousness and that there is nothing either 
self-contradictory or even logically odd in the assertion "You think that 
you ought to do A, but you would be a better man if you did B.7'2 
This judgment, it should be noted, is a moral evaluation. "Better man" 
here means "ethically better." It explicitly excludes "better" in the sense 
of "more useful or less harmful to society" in the reference to Robes- 
pierre. Further, it is not restricted to the mere right or wrong of overt 
acts, saying, for example, that Robespierre would have done less that is 
objectively wrong if he had attended to his roses more and his con- 
science less, for it is a judgment on the moral character of the man, 
not merely on that of his overt acts, and moral judgments upon a man 
must take account of every feature of his personality concerned in the 
performance of his acts, i.e., his motives, intentions, character, beliefs, 
abilities and so forth. What we have here, therefore, is the contention 
that in some cases where conscientiousness would lead to more harm 
than good (as it may do in cases of mistaken moral judgments or other 
ignorance) a man may be a morally better man by stifling his conscience 
and doing what he believes he ought not to do. It is not claimed that 
this will always be true in such cases, and it is not denied that con- 
scientiousness is to some degree a value. But it is denied that it is the 
only moral value, or a value with supreme authority above a11 others, 
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or that it is an essential feature of all moral value. 
These denials are not uncommon among contemporary moralists, but 
it should be noted that they constitute a rejection of the major tradition 
in moral philosophy, from Plato to the present day. They also conflict 
with the convictions of the common man expressed in such injunctions 
as "Let your conscience be your guide," "Do what you yourself believe 
to be right, not what others tell you," "Act on your own convictions," 
"Always act in accord with your own conscience," "To thiie own self 
be true." Conscientiousness is firmness of purpose in seeking to do what 
is right, and to most people it seems to be the very essence of the moral 
life and a value or virtue in some sense "higher" or more important 
than any other, Among philosophers this view is notably expressed in 
Joseph Butler's doctrine of the "natural supremacy" of conscience and 
in Immanuel Kant's insistence that there is nothing good in itself, in- 
trinsically good, save the good will, and that this consists in the will 
to do one's duty for duty's sake. There are, evidently, some complex 
issues and confusions involved in these sharply varying positions and to 
clarify them we shall need to begin with an examination of what is 
involved in conscience itself. 
Analysis of Conscience 
Conscience involves both a cognitive and an emotive or motivational 
element. The cognitive element consists in a set of moral judgments con- 
cerning the right or wrong of certain kinds of action or rules of con- 
duct, however these have been formed. The emotive or motivational 
element consists of a tendency to experience emotions of a unique sort 
of approval of the doing of what is believed to be right and a similarly 
unique sort of disapproval of the doing of what is believed to be wrong. 
These feeling states, it is generally recognized, are noticeably different 
from those of mere liking or disliking and also from feelings of aesthetic 
approval and disapproval (or aesthetic appreciation) and from feel- 
ings of admiration and the reverse aroused by nonmoral activities and 
skills. They can become particularly acute, moving and even distressing, 
in the negative and reflexive form of moral disapproval of one's own 
actions and motives, the sense of guilt and shame. In this form (indeed 
in both forms) they may have some notably irrational manifestations, 
but the sense of shame also has a very valuable function as an in- 
hibitory motive upon the person who contemplates the possibility of do- 
ing what he believes to be wrong. 
These are the commonly recognized aspects of conscience, and they 
frequently function quite uncritically. Because of this uncritical emotive 
reaction conscience all too frequently moves people to approve or dis- 
approve actions and rules concerning which adequate reflection would 
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d to a very different verdict, and sometimes it afflicts people with a 
I @te irrational sense of guilt. These deplorable effects of some mani- 
festations of conscience are a large part of the reason for its devalu- 
ation in the judgment of many modem moralists. What these thinkers 
deplore is the uncritical emotive reaction which the person who 
experiences it calls his conscience, particularly when the emotive ele- 
ment in it inhibits any critical activity of the cognitive element. But it 
is not necessary, and it is not usually the case, that the emotive element 
in conscience stifles the critical, and there is no justification for jumping 
to the conclusion that conscience should be ignored. For critical ethical 
ng is itself usually conscientiousness, and conscience can be trained 
habitually critical. 
r clarity of thinking on this question we need to distinguish be- 
n the critical and the traditional conscience. The latter is uncritical. 
Here the emotive element attaches to moral ideas accepted from the 
tradition without critical re-evaluation of them. Its strength lies in this 
perpetuation of tradition, but this is also the source of its errors. It 
is this blind but emotive perpetuation of an outgrown and mistaken 
condition that contemporary critics of the supreme evaluation of con- 
science, for the most part, are concerned to deplore. And thus far they 
are right. But one would be unfair to such critics if one were not to 
recognize that their efforts to point out the errors of the tradition are 
usually also conscientious and are not merely the echoing of another tra- 
dition. Sometimes their critical ideas are boldly new and very commonly 
they are presented with persistent and painstaking care and in spite of 
personal cost. Nietzsche and Marx, Schweitzer and Gandhi, as well as 
Robespierre, were thoroughly conscientious men. Their ideas were new 
but were held with great emotive strength and tenacity. The same is true 
of the prophets of IsraeI and the great moral innovators of other reli- 
gions. Indeed, the outstanding examples of conscientious men are not 
the mere sustainers of a tradition but the thinkers who try to improve 
the tradition. 
This fact of the vitality of the critical conscience shows the super- 
ficiality of Freud's identification of it with the superego and of the ex- 
planation of it as an aftereffect of early social conditioning, as put 
forward by many psychologists and sociologists, and uncritically adopted 
by many philosophers. On this view the moral judgments which tend 
to arouse spontaneous emotions of approval or disapproval, shame and 
guilt, are those which we learned to make in our childhood and which 
we then heard expressed by those around us accompanied by strong mani- 
festations of moral approval and disapproval. The child, it is pointed out, 
must naturally assimilate the tendency to feel similar emotions whenever 
he himself makes a moral judgment, and this emotive tendency remains 
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with him in aduIt life together with the tendency to frame and express 
such judgments. Conscience is then said to be simply the inward echo 
of the emotionally expressed judgments of our childhood social environ- 
ment. This may be accepted as part of the explanation of the emotive 
element in the uncritical traditional conscience, but as an explanation of 
how men come to feel the way they do about the resuIts of their own 
original critical thinking, and of the motivational drive conscientiously to 
do original critical ethical thinking, it is woefully inadequate. 
It is not difficult to see how the cognitive element in conscience, the 
judgment of right and wrong, becomes critical. To some extent it must 
be so from the beginning. A favorite word in every child's vocabulary 
is "Why?" And especially does he ask for reasons when told that he 
ought to do something he does not want to do. If moral injunctions 
are accepted as such on mere authority it is because it is implicitly be- 
lieved that the authority has good reasons for issuing them, or else 
that the demand or example of this authority is in itself a sufficient 
reason for obedience or conformity, as with kings and deities. Apart 
from authority, reasons for moral rules have to be found in their rele- 
vance to the needs and security and peace of the community and the 
well-being of the person himself. But always, it is a distinguishing mark 
of a moral rule that it is one for which it is believed that reasons can be 
given. Critical thinking about moral rules is therefore stimulated when- 
ever the reasons presented seem inadequate, beginning with the child's 
"Why?" and whenever there is a conflict of rules. 
This critical thinking at first accepts as its basic principles the sort of 
reasons customarily given for moral rules and injunctions-the traditions 
of the tribe, its peace, security, prosperity and honor, revelations from 
divine sources, and so forth. But at a higher level of critical thinking 
conflicts are found between these basic principles themselves, and man 
is directed to the philosophical task of thinking out the most basic of 
all principles-if any such can be found. The search may end in scepti- 
cism and confusion, but so long as the thinker is prepared to accept 
any reason at all. as a reason why something "ought" (in the ethical 
sense) to be done he is also convinced that he ought to do that which 
his search for reasons has led him to beIieve that he ought to do. 
Further, the experience of finding reasons for rejecting old views and 
accepting new ones impresses upon him the need and value of the search. 
Thus, so long as he recognizes any moral reasons at all he must recog- 
nize a duty of continued critical examination of moral ideas, The critical 
conscience thus becomes its own stimulus to further critical thinking. 
Conscience takes the form of the firm conviction, not merely that one 
ought to do what one believes one ought to do, still less that one ought 
to do without question what one has been taught one ought to do, 
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but that one ought to think for oneself as to what one really ought to 
do and then act on one's own convictions. And the emotive drive is 
,pt to attach itself as firmly to this last formulation of the cognitive 
element in conscience as ever it does to the other two. 
Conscience, Love and Personal Integrity 
It is clear that the motivational element of conscience in its most de- 
"eloped form is not merely the continuing echo of approvals and disap- 
p-ovals of specific rules and actions impressed upon us by the social 
environment of our childhood. Yet the emotive content is continuous 
through all the changes in the sort of action the contemplation of which 
arouses it. One can imagine a youth of the eighteenth century feeling 
strong moral approval of a man who challenges a dangerous opponent 
to a duel in defense of his wife's good name, and later, in his maturity, 
feeling similar moral approval of another man who faces social obloquy 
for his refusal to fight a duel in similar circumstances because he is op- 
posed in principle to duelling. In both cases it is the manifestation of 
courage in defense of principle that calls forth the moral approval, but 
his judgment has changed as to the mode of action appropriate to such 
defense. We see that what has changed is the specific sort of action that 
calls forth approval and disapproval, while what remains the same is the 
specific sort of reason that is held to be appropriate for judging an ac- 
tion to be worthy of approval or disapproval. And this we would find 
to be true in general (if we had space to demonstrate it) through the 
whole process of critical re-examination of moral judgment. Moral ap- 
proval and disapproval attach to whatever we find to have reasons for 
approval. These reasons, in the course of thinking, become more and more 
specifically formulated and more and more highly generalized into ab- 
stract principles of moral judgment and they are only changed as change 
is seen to be needed to bring them into consistency with one another. 
Emotive unwillingness to accept some of the consequences of this proc- 
ess of ethical thinking sometimes inhibits and distorts it, but through it 
a l l  the emotive drives of approval and disapproval tend to attach them- 
selves to whatever lines of action are thought to be characterized by the 
recognized reasons for such attitudes. 
On account of the complexity of all their implications the exact and 
proper statement of these basic ethical principles is a matter of very great 
difficulty. Yet there is a degree of agreement as to general principle which 
is really remarkable considering the complexity of human conduct and 
the diversity of traditional moral jud,oment with which we start. Thus, there 
is almost universal agreement that the fact that an act may have bad con- 
sequences for some persons is a good reason for disapproving it, and 
the reverse if it would have good consequences. Similarly there are cer- 
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tain rules of justice that are generally recognized, such as that of im. 
partiality in the distribution of goods and burdens, the keeping of con- 
tracts and promises, the making of reparations, and the equitable ap- 
plication of the law. Questions arise as to how far the duties of benefi- 
cence should go, as to what to do when principles conflict in practical 
application, as to whether all principles can be comprehended under 
some one principle, and so forth. But the general trend is clear. Moral 
approval and disapproval are moved by the thought of the effect of our 
actions upon the weal or woe of human beings, This is the root of con- 
science. If some conscientious thinkers, such as Nietzsche, seem to be an 
exception to this rule it is because they have developed unusual or para. 
doxical views of what really constitutes true human weal or woe, or how 
it can best be promoted. 
This connection of conscience with reasons for action bearing on the 
effects of action on human well-being enables us to understand the dis- 
tinctive feeling-tone of moral approval and disapproval-i.e., their dif- 
ference from mere liking and disliking, and from other emotions such as 
the aesthetic, and from nonmoral admiration and its reverse. The moral 
emotions are often mingled with these others, but they are also different. 
There is in them a distinct element of concern for human welfare which 
is gratified by what promotes it and distressed at anything that seems in- 
jurious. For this reason the moral emotions have often been identified 
with sympathy, but they are not mere passive feeling states. There is 
in them an element of active concern for human values with an impulse 
to give help where it seems needed. For this reason these emotions are 
responsive to judgments about the effects of human action, bringing forth 
a positive response of approval to that which seems helpful and the 
reverse toward the hurtful. For this reason also moral approval is a 
gratifying emotion, inducing a favorable reaction, while moral disap- 
proval is apt to become a source of distress and an occasion for anger. 
For moral approval, we can now see, is a specification in action of the 
most deeply satisfying of all human emotions, that of love, in its most 
general form of expression. 
Moral approval, then, is a development of the basic social interest of 
man as a social animal, it is an expression of the general sympathetic 
tendency of concern for human values with special attention to those 
depending on the orderly fife of the group. It is an expression of the 
desire to create and maintain those values, Its conflict with other motives 
is, therefore, a conflict of desires. But this particular conflict, the conflict 
of conscience (moral approvals and disapprovals) with other desires (ternp- 
tations) is not just an ordinary conflict of desires. It is a conflict in which 
the integrity of the personality is peculiarly involved. In an ordinary con- 
flict of desires, in which there is no moral issue, the best solution is 
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for one of the desires to be completely set aside and fade into oblivion 
regrets, the opposing interest being completely triumphant. And, 
for the integrity of the personality it does not matter which interest 
oives way. But if the conflict be between "conscience" (the interests in- 
"olved in moral approval and disapproval) and "temptation" (some op- 
posed interest or desire) then it does matter which triumphs. The in- 
tegrity of personality is involved. It tends to dissolve as a person slips 
into the habit of doing things he believes to be wrong. He loses his self- 
respect and his firmness of purpose. For a time the sense of guilt de- 
presses. Later it tends to be repressed. With these psychological repres- 
sions the personality tends to manifest either general weakness or the over- 
compensations which give a false impression of strength as they mani- 
fest themselves in irrational drives. The guilty conscience and the re- 
pressed conscience are at the root of most of the disorders of personality, 
whether the guilt itself be reasonably conceived or not. 
It is evident, therefore, that the emotive or motivational element that 
manifests itself in conscience is rooted in conative tendencies or interests 
which are of basic importance in the life of man. This psychological 
conclusion has, in recent years, been strongly emphasized by a number 
of workers in the field of psychotherapy, notably by Erich Fromm, who 
argues strongly that only in what he calls the "orientation of productive 
love"3 can the personality of man develop continuously and with the in- 
tegrity necessary for mental health. From this conclusion concerning the 
psychological need of this type of orientation Fromm also develops a 
most important theory of conscience. What we have distinguished as the 
critical and uncritical (or traditional) conscience he distinguishes as the 
"authoritarian" and the  humanistic^^ conscience. The former he dismisses 
as the internalized voice of an external authority, but the latter, he main- 
tains, is "the reaction of our total personality to its proper functioning 
or disfunctioning. . . . Conscience is thus . . . the voice of our true selves 
which summons us . . . to live productively, to develop fully and har- 
moniously. . . . I t  is the guardian of our integrity."" 
If Fromm's psychological analysis of the growth and structure of per- 
sonality is accurate in essentials, and if our account of the growth of the 
critical conscience out of the uncritical is aIso correct, then we must recog- 
nize that conscience at every stage is, as Fromm says of the "humanis- 
tic" conscience, "the reaction of our total personality to its total function- 
ing," its "voice" is the experience of the constraint of the personality as 
a whole, in its seeking of a growing creative expression with integrity 
or wholeness, upon the occasionaI and temporary impuIses and desires 
which would tend to stultify its creativity and destroy its integrity. It is 
because doing what we believe we ought not is destructive of that in- 
tegrity that conscience demands that we always act in accord with our 
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own convictions; and it is because the fundamental orientation of human 
life is social and creative that ethical thinking tends, through the course 
of history, to clarify itself in the light of principles which tend to formu- 
late moral judgments as expressions of impartial concern for human well. 
being. 
The Authority of Conscience 
It is time now to return to the question with which we started. Is it 
true that a man would sometimes be a better man (i.e., morally better) 
for refusing to obey his conscience rather than obeying it? It should be 
noted that the question is not whether the consequences to himself or to 
others might be better in general, but whether he would, himself, be a 
morally better man for acting in this way. This raises the question 
whether it is ever morally right to go against one's conscience. Is it 
ever right to do as you think you ought not to do? And this, again, 
is not the question whether conscience is always right in what it corn- 
mands us to do, but whether it is ever right to disobey those commands, 
thus choosing to do what we believe to be wrong? The traditional answer 
is given by Joseph Butler in asserting the "natural supremacy" of con- 
science, which "magisterially asserts itself and approves and condemns." 
"Had it strength as it had right: had it power, as it had manifest au- 
thority, it would absolutely govern the world." "gainst this we have the 
contemporary challenge voiced by Nowell-Smith. 
One serious objection to this modern challenge to the traditional view 
is that it is necessarily futile and worse than futile, as a guiding principle 
of moral behaviour. It is futile because, though a man may believe that 
perhaps, in some cases, it may be that he would be a better man if he 
did not do what he believes he ought to do, he can never believe this 
in any particular case, for that would be to believe that he ought not to 
do this that he believes he ought to do, which is self-contradictory. Thus 
this piece of ethical theory is so paradoxical that it can never function 
as a guide to action. Further, it is worse than futile, for it implies, not 
merely that moral judgment may be mistaken (and therefore needs criti- 
cal examination) but that the very effort not to do wrong may itself 
sometimes be wrong-that the conscientious effort to try to find out what 
is really right and act firmly in accord with one's own convictions, is 
sometimes wrong and we have no way of knowing when it is wrong. 
From this state of mind the only reasonable reaction is to abandon the 
ethical inquiry and the ethical endeavor and make the easiest and most 
satisfactory adjustment we can to the mores of the community and the 
practical exigencies of our personal situation, 
The logical alternatives, therefore, are either to abandon the moral 
standpoint entirely, or to affirm, with Butler, the moral authority of every 
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olan'~ own conscience. The fact that judgments conscientiously made may 
be in error does not imply that this assertion of the sovereignty of the 
individual conscience must lead to either conflict or chaos. It  rather avoids 
for each person, in asserting the rights of his own conscience, 
at the same time affirms the right of freedom of conscience for others. 
~ n d  it avoids chaos because, laying the injunction upon us to exercise 
continuous critical examination of our own moral judgments, it points 
us on the only possible way to consistency and order in moral judgment, 
by finding our errors and rectifying them. A community of people open- 
mindedly seeking the best formulation and reformulation of its moral rules, 
and abiding by its most intelligent findings, is more likely to maintain 
order with progress than one in which conscience operates in any other 
way, or in no way at all. 
We must conclude, then, that if one were to accept Nowell-Smith's 
critique of conscience one could not apply it to the decision of any moral 
question in one's own conduct, and that its acceptance, if taken seriously, 
would be apt to have a deteriorating effect upon personal moral endeavor. 
But it is still possible to grant it theoretical credence and apply it to our 
evaluation of the moral vaIue of the personality of others. This is what 
Nowell-Smith does in the cases of Robespierre and the Oxford don: Robes- 
pierre would have been a better man if he had indulged his taste for 
roses and sentimental verse rather than follow the demands of his con- 
science that he strive by whatever terrible means seemed necessary to 
carry through the program of the revolution; and the Oxford don would 
have been a better man if he had allowed his personal distaste for Com- 
mon Room society to overcome his sense of duty which required him to 
attend it. 
This is a judgment on the moral quality of the man as affected by 
his act of choice. The choice with which we are concerned is not that 
of his decision as to whether A or B is the right thing to do but his de- 
cision as to whether he would do what he believed to  be the right thing 
or follow his personal wishes to do something that he found much more 
agreeable to himself. The latter act is the one he would do if he had 
not given any consideration to the effect of his actions on other people, 
or the needs of the social structure of which he is a part, except so 
far as his own interests were involved, and, coming as it does after he 
has considered these things and formed a judgment as to what they re- 
quire of him, it is a decision to set aside the results of this thoughtful 
examination of the possible consequences of his conduct and do the thing 
he personally wants to do and would have done if he had never given 
the matter any ethical thought at all. When the issue is thus clearly 
stated it is very difficult to see how any thoughtfu1 person could judge 
the unconscientious following of inclination to be the act of a better man, 
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or an act that tends to make a better man, than the careful thinking 
and active self-determination involved in conscientiousness. It  seems evi- 
dent that those who have expressed the view that the following of per. 
sonal inclination is sometimes morally better than conscientiousness are 
confusing this issue with another to which we must next give attention. 
Conscientiousness and Other Values 
For Immanuel Kant there was nothing good in itself, good without 
qualification, except a good will, and a good will, he explains, is good, 
not because it is a will to produce some good, or even the greatest pas- 
sible good, but simply by reason of the nature of its volition as a will 
to do one's duty, a will to do what is conceived as right. Thus, for Kant, 
an action only has moral worth if it is done from a sense of duty, not 
from any inclination, even that of an impartial desire to promote general 
human well-being. Kant does not deny that good-natured inclinations have 
value, but he insists that the will to do one's duty has incomparably 
higher value and that it alone is of distinctly moral value. Kant's po- 
sition here is an extreme one. Conscientiousness is regarded not merely 
as an essential part of moral value but as the only truly moral value 
and supreme among all values. Against this Nowell-Smith is not alone 
in protesting, and it is this rejection of the extravagant claim for conscien- 
tiousness as compared with other values, that seems to him to justify 
the notion that there are some occasions when some other value should 
be preferred and conscientiousness r e j e~ ted .~  
It is true, as Nowell-Smith says, that "we normally think of moral 
worth as meaning the worth of any virtuous motive and we normally 
think of sympathy and benevolence as virtuous  motive^."^ It is also true, 
that, contrary to Kant, we normally judge a right action done out of 
sympathy and good will to be morally better than the same action would 
be if done solely from a sense of duty but without sympathy or good 
will.8 These normal jud,ments I think we must fully endorse, but they do 
not involve the implication that a man can be morally justified (i.e., can 
be a "better man" than he otherwise would be) in performing an act, 
even of sympathy and good will (let aIone indulging an interest in roses), 
which, in the circumstances, he regards as wrong. 
There is a story told by Mark Twain of two ladies who lied to pro- 
tect a runaway slave even though believing it wrong to do so and fear- 
ing that they might suffer in hell for their sin. In such a case we see a 
conflict, not merely of conscience with desire, but of the uncritical or 
traditional conscience with the critical. The deeper level of conscience, 
which they might well have called their "intuitions," urged the protec- 
tion of the poor, frightened slave. They were not sufficiently capable of 
philosophical thinking to formulate a philosophical critique in support of 
CONSCIENCE AND CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 8 1 
heir own deeper insights, so they remained superficially of the traditional 
opinion that their action was wrong. But their choice was actually a 
conscientious one, true to the deeper levels of conscience, and we tend 
to endorse their decision because it is endorsed by our consciences too. 
~ u t  this example (and others like it) is not a case of judging that the 
of love and sympathy were here better than conscientiousness, 
but of judging that the will to do good, seen as the very root of righteous- 
oess, is better than the will to conform to rules uncritically accepted as 
right. Such a judgment is far from the same as judging that the Oxford 
don would have been a moralIy better man for indulging his reluctance 
Common Room than he would for conscientiously fulfilling what 
ed to be his duty in the matter. 
If we accept a teleological ethics then we recognize that the purpose of 
moral rules is to protect and promote the more important aspects of 
social well-being. We then see that the motives of love and sympathy, 
if sufficiently strong, enlightened and impartial, would achieve the pur- 
poses of moral rules better than the moral rules do, and would also 
achieve other good purposes beyond them. A world of saints would 
be a better world than a world of conscientious persons without mutual 
love and sympathy. Seeing this, though there are no saints, we endorse 
such elements of saintliness as there are (i.e., love and sympathy ex- 
pressed in this enlightened and impartial way) and recognize them as 
morally good and as expressions of a better type of personality than one 
in which conscientiousness is found without these motives. But this recog- 
nition of the greater value of enlightened and impartial good will, or love, 
can never involve a rejection of conscientiousness in favor of such love, 
for such love includes and transcends all that conscientiousness stands for, 
Such love is the fulfilling of the law and the fulfilling, not the rejection, of 
the conscientiousness which supports the law. Thus, while a teleological 
ethics rejects Kant7s apotheosis of the will to do one's duty as the only 
intrinsic moral value it does not lead to an endorsement of the view that 
we should sometimes judge a man as morally better for neglecting his 
conscience to indulge some other inclination. If, on the other hand, we 
were to accept a deontological ethics we should find that to speak of a 
conflict between conscientiousness and an enlightened and impartial love 
and sympathy (or any other good motive) as a conflict between different 
moral values involves a category mistake. For conscientiousness and other 
good motives, on this view, are not moral values in the same sense. An 
act of love is not made moral by the kind of consequences at which it 
aims. The only moral actions are those which intentionally adhere to 
intuitively discerned principles. So whatever value is attached to love and 
sympathy, it is not moral value. Moral value belongs alone to conscien- 
tiousness, Thus a man could never become morally better by rejecting 
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the morally valuabIe motive of conscientiousness for some other motive to 
which only nonmoral value is attached. This deontological theory no we^, 
Smith, I think rightly, rejects, but it is well to see that it, too, involves 
a rejection of his theory of the comparison of conscie~ltiousness with 
other moral values. 
Returning to the teleological point of view, and reflecting on the dean- 
tologist's claim, we can perhaps see the reason for the basic confusions 
that haunt people's minds on this question of the relative value of con-. 
scientiousness and impartial good will, or love. Conscientiousness is 
uniquely a moral motive in that its end is morality itself, the keeping of 
moral rules. All other motives, if without conscientiousness, are at best 
nonmoral (operating without concern for moral rules) or at worst im- 
moral---consciously in opposition to them. This is true even of love 
and sympathy, simply as such. But if the teleological point of view is 
correct it is not true of love and sympathy with a concern for impartial- 
ity, for this latter is the very basis of moral rules and such love is of 
the essence of the moral life. Thus conscientiousness and impartial good 
will share together the unique character of being moral in the sense of 
being motivated by a concern for morality as such, the former for the 
rules which formulate it in lines of conduct, and the latter for the basic 
principle of impartial concern for human well-being in accordance with 
which the rules merely formulate the guiding lines. But this merely 
means that impartial good will is a motive characterized by the critical 
conscience, while conscientiousness without love, sympathy or good will 
is an operation of the traditional or uncritical conscience alone. Thus the 
motive that is of uniquely moral value and of supreme moral authority 
is love finding expression in the form of the critical conscience. 
The main conclusions, therefore, of this paper may be summed up 
briefly thus: (1) Conscientiousness, if it be properly critical, is good with- 
out qualification, but an uncritical conscientiousness is not. (2) Since 
we cannot be saints we need to be conscientious, and this includes both 
the effort to find out what we really ought to do and the effort to do 
it to the best of our ability. ( 3 )  We should also cultivate the motive of 
impartial love or good will, for it functions as both an illuminating guide 
and support to our efforts to be conscientious and is itself of intrinsic 
moral value. (4) We can be righteous, and to that extent good, men 
merely by being conscientious, but we can be much better men by being 
not only conscientious but men in whom, without conflicting with con- 
science, the effort to be conscientious is made unnecessary by the out- 
flow of spontaneous good will. These are very ordinary conclusions, but 
it takes clear thinking to keep them free from some very extraordinary 
objections. 
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